The FiveM Script Security Checklist
FiveM script security breaks down into checkable habits, not a single property: validating every net event's source, permission, rate, and argument types; parameterizing every SQL query; keeping secrets server-side only; enforcing rate limits from server state; and having a written answer for all four when the code is escrowed and unreadable. This is the procedure for checking each one, on any resource.
Most public FiveM exploit writeups trace back to the absence of one specific habit, not a sophisticated attack. This checklist treats security as five separate, checkable things rather than one vague property, so a review produces a list of pass/fail results instead of an impression.
It extends the server-authority checklist with the parts that aren't specifically about who decides an outcome: SQL injection, secret handling, and the procedure for reviewing a resource when part or all of it is escrowed and unreadable. Run both checklists together for a full picture — this one assumes you've already read the authority checklist's definition of a client-trusting handler.
It's written to be run by a server owner before a purchase or by an engineer before a release, using the same steps either way.
Reproducible, step by step.
- 01Map the attack surfaceEnumerate every RegisterNetEvent / RegisterServerEvent, export, command, and RegisterNUICallback the resource registers. A surface you haven't mapped can't be reviewed.
- 02Validate net eventsFor each registered event, confirm source, permission, rate, and argument-type checks happen server-side before any effect. Full method: the server-authority checklist.
- 03Check SQL usageGrep for query calls. Every value that varies per call must arrive as a bound parameter — never string-concatenated into the query text.
- 04Check for injection-shaped codeSearch specifically for query strings built with concatenation or string formatting that includes a variable sourced from a net event or NUI callback — that's the exact path an injection attempt would travel.
- 05Check secret handlingGrep config and shipped files for API keys, webhook URLs, and database credentials. Confirm they load from server-side convars or a config file the client never receives — never from anything reachable by the client or exposed to the NUI layer.
- 06Check rate limitingConfirm cooldown or throttle state is stored and checked server-side — a table keyed by player id, a timestamp compared on the server — not reported by the client.
- 07Check permission sourceConfirm role, job, or ACE checks read from the framework's server-side state, never from a flag the client passed in.
- 08For escrowed portions, request the same six answers in writingThen test what you still can behaviorally — spam, forged values, out-of-state calls — on a staging server.
- 09Record pass/fail with evidenceFile and line reference for open code; the seller's written statement plus your own behavioral test result for escrowed code.
What this measures — and what it does not.
The second column is the one that matters. A method that only advertises its reach is a brochure; the limits are what let you judge whether a result means anything for your server.
What it measures
- Whether every net event has server-side source, permission, rate, and argument-type checks.
- Whether SQL queries use bound parameters instead of concatenated strings.
- Whether secrets — keys, webhooks, database credentials — are reachable from any client-delivered file or NUI-exposed object.
- Whether rate-limit and permission state are stored and checked server-side.
What it does NOT measure
- Server or hosting-level security — firewall rules, OS patching, control-panel access — this checklist is scoped to the resource's own code, not the box it runs on.
- Whether a specific vulnerability has been exploited in the wild — this is a review procedure, not an incident history.
- The cryptographic strength of Cfx's asset-escrow distribution mechanism itself — that's a platform property outside any single resource's code.
What counts as a pass, and what does not.
| Criterion | Pass | Fail |
|---|---|---|
| Net event validation | Source, permission, rate, and argument types are all checked server-side before any state-changing event applies its effect. | Any event applies its effect before completing all four checks. |
| SQL parameterization | Every variable value in a query is passed as a bound parameter. | Any query is built by concatenating a variable — especially one sourced from a net event or NUI callback — into the query string. |
| Secret handling | API keys, webhook URLs, and database credentials are read server-side only, from a convar or a config file the client never receives. | Any secret appears in a client-reachable file, an NUI-exposed object, or a public export's return value. |
| Rate limiting | A cooldown or throttle enforced from server-stored state exists on every action worth spamming. | No server-side rate limit exists, or the only throttle is a client-side UI debounce. |
| Escrowed-code review | The seller answers all of the above in writing, and the resource passes every behavioral test you can still run. | The seller won't describe their validation, secret handling, or rate limiting in writing. |
Our own results against this method.
- Server-authoritative validation, parameterized queries, and server-side rate limiting are binding internal standards for every Vice Drip product — but binding internally is not the same claim as independently reviewed, and no product has published a third-party security review against this checklist.
- ForgeCore (vf_core), the free bridge, ships fully open with its own rate limiter, argument validator, and parameterized oxmysql wrapper built in, specifically so this checklist can be run against the shared layer directly rather than taken on faith.
- No product in the catalog has a dated, published secret-handling or SQL-injection review on file as of this writing. The discipline is applied during development; the audit transcript this checklist calls for does not yet exist publicly for any product, including ours.
- We do not use the words unhackable, exploit-proof, or secure as an absolute. A resource can pass every item on this checklist and still contain a bug nobody has found yet. This checklist reduces the common, well-understood failure classes — it does not certify the absence of all of them.
What's the single most common security failure in paid FiveM scripts?
A net event that applies its effect using a client-sent value — a price, an amount, a permission flag — with no independent server-side check. It's covered in more depth in the server-authority checklist, but it's also the first thing worth grepping for.
Why does SQL parameterization matter if the server already validates input?
They stop different failures. Validation stops a value from being wrong. Parameterization stops a value from being interpreted as code once it reaches the database. Skipping either leaves the other as your only defense.
How do I check secret handling without reading escrowed code?
Ask the seller directly where API keys, webhooks, and database credentials are read from, and confirm none of them ship inside any file the client receives or any object exposed to the NUI layer. A specific answer is a good sign; a vague one is itself an answer.
Is a rate limiter enough to stop macro or spam exploits?
Only if it's enforced server-side from state the server itself tracks. A client-side cooldown — disabling a button in the UI — stops nothing, because the underlying net event is still callable directly at any rate.
Published 2026-09-02 · Last reviewed 2026-09-02 · All methodology